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Chapter 8




Landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) affect communities and 
individuals long after conflicts end and therefore have a profound effect on 
opportunities for post-conflict peacebuilding. In the immediate post-conflict 
phase the presence, or simply the threat, of landmines can hamper refugee 
return and the implementation of humanitarian assistance programmes. They 
pose a long-term social, economic and environmental threat that denies the 
use of fertile land and access to water and affects flows of people, goods and 
services. There is also an important security risk from abandoned explosive 
ordnance stockpiles or caches which, if not properly secured or destroyed 
following the end of hostilities, offer rich pickings for insurgents, rebel 
groups, criminals and other disaffected elements that mark the post-conflict 
landscape. Mine action – ‘activities which aim to reduce the social, 
economic and environmental impact of mines and UXO’2 – is therefore an 
important aspect of post-conflict peacebuilding, both in its own right and as 
an enabling activity for other elements of the peacebuilding agenda. 
The governance of mine action involves a wide range of stakeholders 
both at the strategic policy level and in the implementation of mine action 
programmes on the ground. For a number of reasons that will be discussed 
below, linkages and potential synergies between mine action and other post-
conflict peacebuilding activities have not been fully exploited. This chapter 
will assess the complexities of governing mine action generally as well as 
potential and actual linkages to other elements of post-conflict peacebuilding 
by analysing two interrelated governance issues. First, the multi-actor, multi-
level nature of mine action creates barriers between different stakeholders, 
potential democratic deficits in decision-making processes and a knowledge 
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gap between constituencies both at the strategic level and in the field. It will 
be argued that stakeholders need to be brought closer together, coordination 
mechanisms reassessed and fresh expertise tapped, if progress is to be 
sustained and synergies with other peacebuilding activities fully realised. 
Second, in post-conflict peacebuilding, the involvement of the international 
community offers important opportunities, but also creates particular 
challenges. A security governance perspective provides a means to better 
link policy and practical mine action agendas with the wider security 
governance challenges faced by states emerging from conflict. These 
challenges relate, on the one hand, to coordination and cooperation between 
different elements of the international community’s response. On the other, 
they are embedded in the relationship between international actors and 
domestic stakeholders, and in particular the common goal of building 
capacity and instilling local ownership of post-conflict peacebuilding 
activities.
The chapter begins by tracing the emergence of mine action on the 
international humanitarian agenda and its evolution as a humanitarian 
activity. It then considers the various mechanisms adopted by the 
international community to address this challenge and analyses gaps in 
current approaches from the perspective of security governance. Linkages 
between mine action and other aspects of post-conflict peacebuilding are 
assessed drawing on the cases of Afghanistan and Kosovo. The chapter 
concludes with several policy recommendations drawn from this analysis. 
The Evolution of Mine Action 
Although a number of historical weapons can be linked to the modern 
landmine, mass-produced landmines have only been in widespread use since 
the 1939–45 war, with significant mine clearance activities having taken 
place since 1945.3 However, mine action as a distinct humanitarian 
discipline only really began in Afghanistan from 1988 with a UN-assisted 
appeal for funds to assist ‘humanitarian demining.’4 The UN subsequently 
supported the creation of a number of Afghan non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) and facilitated their training in mine clearance 
techniques, setting a precedent for the involvement of various UN bodies in 
the coordination and implementation of mine action globally. The first of 
many international NGOs operating in this field, the HALO Trust,5 was also 
founded in the same year to work in Afghanistan. Mine action activities 
subsequently expanded to many other countries,6 particularly in Asia, Africa 
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and the Balkans, but also, though to a more limited extent, in Eastern Europe 
and the Americas. The mine and UXO clearance operation which followed 
the 1991 Gulf War was notable for the emergence of a number of 
commercial demining companies who have since become significant actors 
in mine action.  
Mine action is distinguished by its underpinning humanitarian 
objective to make land safe for civilians. This logic is closely linked to the 
nature of recent  armed conflicts – particularly intra-state – in the developing 
world involving the use of landmines not only as a tactical means of combat 
against the enemy, but also as a weapon of terror specifically targeted 
against civilians. In the immediate post-conflict phase of mine action, risk 
reduction is therefore the key priority, clearing those mines that pose the 
most immediate threat to human life. These priorities later shift to a 
‘developmental’ emphasis on reducing the threat in socio-economic terms 
posed by the presence of mines and other UXO. Indeed, one of the biggest 
shifts in thinking within mine action since its inception has been from early 
emphasis on the extent of mine infestation as a starting point for priority 
setting, to an assessment of humanitarian impact as the key factor in 
prioritising tasks. This is reflected in the definition of ‘mine action’ in the 
international mine action standards (IMAS) as comprising: (1) mine risk 
education; (2) humanitarian demining; (3) victim assistance; (4) stockpile 
destruction; and (5) advocacy.7
The five components of mine action span the range of security, 
development and policy-related activities that are most prominent in 
addressing the threat posed by landmines and UXO: mine risk education
refers to activities which seek to reduce the risk of injuries from mines and 
UXO by raising awareness and promoting behavioural change; humanitarian 
demining refers to activities which lead to the removal of mine and UXO 
hazards (including mine and UXO survey, marking and clearance); victim 
assistance refers to all aid, relief, comfort and support provided to those 
whose lives have been blighted by the explosion of a mine or item of UXO; 
stockpile destruction refers to the physical destructive procedure of the 
national stockpile of anti-personnel mines; and advocacy refers to public 
support, recommendation or positive publicity with the aim of removing, or 
at least reducing, the threat from mines and UXO.  
The use of landmines is regulated by two international treaty 
frameworks: the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) and the 
UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW).8 The APMBC, 
opened for signature in December 1997, lays down a complete ban on the 
use, production, transfer and stockpiling of anti-personnel landmines 
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(APMs). Amended Protocol II (APII) to the CCW, which had previously 
been agreed in 1996, largely only restricts landmines, especially anti-
personnel mines, seeking to minimise their effects through regulating their 
use while accepting the underlying legitimacy of the weapons. Protocol V to 
the CCW, which was adopted in 2003 but which has not yet entered into 
force, establishes measures to address wider categories of explosive 
remnants of war beyond landmines. If the Ottawa process9 that led to the 
adoption of the APMBC has been most prominent in mobilising public 
opinion and effectively stigmatising APMs, the CCW framework is 
important in applying international humanitarian law (IHL) to specific 
weapons that pose a particular danger to the well-being of civilians or inflict 
excessive harm on combatants. The consensus-based CCW framework also 
engages States such as China, India, Pakistan, Russia, and the United States, 
who still consider APMs militarily useful and are therefore unlikely to 
adhere to the APMBC in the near future. 
Governing Mine Action 
Considering mine action from a governance perspective involves an 
understanding of the various levels of political authority – national, sub-
national and international – which shape mine action. On these different 
levels, principles of ‘good governance’ – such as accountability, 
transparency and democratic participation – are particularly relevant.10 As 
illustrated in Table 8.1, mine action is governed at the strategic level by 
various actors within the UN system, donor governments, international 
organisations and NGOs. These actors are also central to the implementation 
of mine action programmes alongside commercial companies and a range of 
national actors in mine-affected countries.  
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Table 8.1: Key Mine Action Governance Actors and Roles11
Actor Responsibilities
International level
UNDPKO Department responsible for UNMAS; integrates mine action into 
peacekeeping, USG for Peacekeeping chairs Inter-Agency 
Coordination Group on Mine Action (IACG-MA) 
UNMAS Overall policy coordination within and beyond UN system; provides 
mine action assistance in humanitarian emergencies; oversees 
international mine action standards (IMAS); coordinates planning for 
transfer to national authorities 
UNDP Supports development of national and local mine action capacity, 
promotes coordination between mine action and wider development 
community at country level 
UNOPS Service provider in design/implementation of mine action programmes 
UNICEF Supports development and implementation of mine risk education 
projects in cooperation with UN and other partners 
UNDDA Supports UNSG in relation to APMBC and CCW; promotes 
dissemination of annual State reports under the treaties 
OCHA Lead agency for information sharing on humanitarian impact of 
landmines and resource mobilisation 
UNHCR Addresses special needs of refugees in mine action 
OSAGI Advances gender equality and empowerment of women in mine action 
OHCHR Advances human rights aspects of mine action 
World Bank Resource mobilisation and agenda setting on landmines as an 
impediment to development 
WFP/WHO/FAO Linkages between mine action and respective mandates in food, health 
and agriculture 
Donor states Funding/in-kind support for mine action  
ICRC Promotes development and implementation of IHL, victim assistance 
and mine risk education 
GICHD Operational assistance in mine action, research, development of 
IMAS, support for APMBC process 
ICBL Monitoring and advocacy for APMBC, research and production of 
Landmine Monitor 




Various, local and international, involved in range of mine action 
activities, but primarily clearance 
Organisation of 
American States 
Military to military training in clearance/stockpile destruction; some 
other mine action activities  
European Union Funding largely through the European Commission, commitment to 
research and development 
Alan Bryden 164








Border guards  
Develop, articulate and implement mine action policies and 
programmes in accountable, transparent and cost-effective manner. 
Draft and implement necessary domestic legislation. 
Ensure compliance with legal obligations, scrutiny of budgets, 
projects etc. 
Prosecution of offenders under national law 
Mine clearance, stockpile destruction 
Ensure respect for land ownership following clearance 








In some countries, engaged in selection of sites for clearance 
Managing the risks from mines or UXO on a daily basis12
National and local level mine risk education and support for victim 
assistance 
Provide spotlight/pressure on government decision-making, focus 
on issues such as corruption. Key mine risk education role. 
Advocacy role, assistance to victims, mine risk education etc.  
The Strategic Policy Framework 
The UN has the predominant role in the coordination of mine action 
globally. The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), set up in 
October 1997 as part of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations 
(DPKO), serves as the focal point for mine action within the UN system. 
This includes mine action assistance in humanitarian emergencies and 
peacekeeping operations, ensuring coordination between UN Headquarters 
and its field operations as well as partners outside the UN system. These 
actors come together in an Inter-Agency Coordination Group on Mine 
Action and in a Steering Committee on Mine Action which also includes the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the Geneva International 
Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) the International Campaign to 
Ban Landmines (ICBL), as well as various mine action NGOs.  
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A 1997 report commissioned by the UN on The Development of 
Indigenous Mine Action Capabilities13 was strongly critical of UN 
management and strategy, notably regarding the speed of initiation of 
programmes in war-torn environments. The study emphasised the need for a 
mix of political, management and technical expertise as well as reform of 
budgetary and administrative procedures. These criticisms of the UN role in 
coordinating mine action can still be heard today and stem from the 
organisation’s multiple commitments, including for policy, norms and 
standards setting, implementation, and coordination. These problems are 
clearly exacerbated by the multiplicity of actors involved within and outside 
of the UN system. 
Mine action has been funded by a relatively small number of donor 
governments, notably Canada, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom and 
the United States. Much of this funding, estimated at $2.07 billion for the 
period 1992–2003,14 has been prompted, directly or indirectly, by the 
APMBC. Donors contribute to mine action either through the UN or 
bilaterally through support for mine action NGOs or commercial companies, 
as well as through the provision of equipment, personnel and training, and 
investments in research and development. UNMAS coordinates the 
Voluntary Trust Fund (VTF) for assistance in mine action which was 
established in 1994 to provide resources for UN mine action where other 
sources were not available. The VTF has proved an inefficient mechanism 
for channelling money to programmes and is disliked by donors because of 
the high overheads retained by the UN Administration and its slow 
disbursement of funds to field operations. Increased use of bilateral and 
other funding mechanisms have sought to bypass such bureaucratic 
bottlenecks but have also posed problems for the UN’s mine action 
coordination role. The key governance mechanisms which apply to different 
levels of mine action are described in Table 8.2 below. 
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Group on Mine Action
Integration and coordination of UN mine action 
SCMA 
Steering Committee on 
Mine Action
Coordination between UN and other mine action actors 
MASG 
Mine Action Support Group




Convened by states in margins of APMBC Standing 
Committee to address treaty issues 
Forum of Mine Affected 
Countries 
Cooperation mechanism for New York-based 
representatives of mine affected countries 
UN Programme Managers 
meeting 
Annual information exchange between UN field managers, 
UNHQ and other stakeholders 
APMBC
Anti-Personnel Mine Ban 
Convention
Annual reporting requirements, annual meetings and five-
yearly review conferences, intersessional work programme 
related to treaty implementation 
CCW
Convention on Certain 
Conventional Weapons
Annual reporting requirements, review meetings on treaty 
implementation
IMAS 
International Mine Action 
Standards
Guidelines for national governments, mine action centres 
(MACs) and demining organisations as a basis for 
standards, standard operating procedures 
VTF
Voluntary Trust Fund
Provides resources for UN mine action where other funding 
not available 
ITEP
International Test and 
Evaluation Programme
Facilitates cooperative testing of mine action equipment 
and technologies 
Optimising Mine Action Policies and Practice  167 
Table 8.2 continued: Key Mine Action Governance Mechanisms 
The Legal and Normative Framework 
The origins of the campaign that led to the APMBC began entirely through 
the efforts of civil society. The ICRC raised the problem of increasing 
numbers of landmine amputees through diplomatic, legal and public 
awareness efforts while the NGOs that came together to form the ICBL15
brought a range of field experience to the issue. The strength of the ICBL lay 
in its structure, combining a small international staff which provided 
direction and coordinated policy on behalf of hundreds of local organisations 
around the world. These civil society efforts combined with the work of 
sympathetic States to lay the ground for the successful negotiation of the 
treaty. This coalition of States, international organisations, and NGOs was 
particularly influential because of its cross-regional nature, undercutting 
Regional/Subregional
ITF
International Trust Fund 
Raises funds for mine action in South Eastern Europe
National
UNCT
United Nations Country 
Team 
Principal country level coordination mechanism composed 
of representatives of UN agencies, led by senior UN 
official in country 
NMAA
National Mine Action 
Authority
Government department(s), organisation(s) or 
institutions(s) – often an interministerial body –  in a mine-
affected country charged with overall mine action 
regulation, management, coordination 
MAC
Mine Action Centre
Organisation or institution that carries out operational mine 
action coordination; has primary responsibility for 
information management; develops workplans with local 
organisations/external agencies/NGOs /deminers 
Sub-State
Deed of Commitment Non-legally binding document used by NGO Geneva Call 
to engage non-state actors to ban APMs and cooperate on 
mine action 
MAPU
Mine Action Planning Unit
Used in Cambodia to prioritise clearance tasks based on 
requests from communes, villages, districts; issues 
documents confirming land ownership 
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traditional alliances and multilateral channels of communication.16 Price 
notes that ‘the most basic effect of civil society, then, has been the 
transnational dissemination of information about the scope of landmine use 
and its effects, thereby helping to define the use of AP landmines as not only 
a problem but as a global crisis’.17 The movement to ban anti-personnel 
mines grew because a ban seemed the logical solution to an obvious 
humanitarian disaster. As important as the inclusive nature of the Ottawa 
process was its message. Ken Anderson, former Director of the Arms 
Division at Human Rights Watch, notes that ‘this utter moral and political 
clarity was an integral part of the campaign in reaching various publics’.18
The visibility of the mine ban issue was, therefore, essential to the success of 
the pro-ban lobby. 
The APMBC represents a unique modern example where a grassroots 
campaign has combined with inter-State negotiations, outside of the UN 
framework and without the critical involvement of major powers, to produce 
an international arms control agreement.19 Certainly, widespread resistance 
to US lobbying during the Ottawa negotiations, including by close allies 
France and the United Kingdom, demonstrates the strength of the anti-APM 
norm. There is also evidence that the process has had some influence on the 
behaviour of States not party to the treaty: the US complies de facto with the 
majority of the treaty’s requirements while Russia and China have ceased 
APM exports.20 The APMBC is also significant in terms of norm spillover 
with momentum from the anti-APM campaign providing new vigour to 
advocacy efforts in related issues such as small arms and light weapons, 
cluster bombs and explosive remnants of war.  
The ICBL retains an influential role in the implementation of the 
APMBC although concerns have been voiced over its structure and whether 
the organisation has adapted to the qualitatively different demands of treaty 
implementation. Anderson qualifies the frequently held association of the 
Ottawa process with a ‘new diplomacy’21 or ‘new multilateralism’22 by 
pointing out the ‘permanently incurable democratic deficit’ when NGOs 
work directly with State actors, cautioning against the conflation of NGO 
coalitions with civil society more broadly.23 Hubert also recognises, ‘the risk 
that humanitarian advocates would seek second best solutions that are 
palatable to progressive governments, particularly where NGO coalitions are 
largely the product of government funding’.24 Annual meetings of States 
Parties to the APMBC and an intersessional work programme have become 
major fora to discuss implementation and interpretation of treaty obligations. 
These intersessional meetings were reduced in frequency in 2005 following 
a decision by States Parties at the first Review Conference of the APMBC 
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and have been regarded in some quarters as more significant for awareness-
raising among the diplomatic community than for bringing tangible benefits 
to mine action in the field.  
Article 7 of the APMBC requires annual reporting to the UN 
Secretary General on a range of treaty issues. This transparency measure is 
complemented by a significant annual ICBL publication, Landmine Monitor,
which reports on every State (whether or not they have adhered to the treaty) 
as well as major contested territories. It has also allowed local researchers to 
provide their input on mine-related issues. This comprehensive publication 
records progress and highlights problems in the implementation of the treaty. 
It represents a positive example of giving ‘teeth’ to a disarmament treaty in 
the absence of formal, treaty-based verification mechanisms.   
The APMBC has produced clear benefits in areas such as stockpile 
destruction, in the eradication of the licit trade in APMs, and more broadly in 
normative terms through effectively stigmatising the use of APMs. However, 
some mine action practitioners feel that an undue emphasis on advocacy 
distracts attention and resources from mine action in the field. A related 
concern is that while ‘ownership’ of mine action is highly visible in policy 
statements and international meetings, the true influence of the South in 
policy formulation is, arguably, much more limited. Beier questions the 
association commonly found in the literature which cites the Ottawa process 
as a success of global civil society by distinguishing between ‘collapsed 
political time’ as a result of the Ottawa process and ‘unchanged political 
space’ in its impact on ownership of the process by mine-affected 
countries.25 Although analysis of the ‘ownership’ of the Ottawa process 
would require significant further analysis, the potential for the process to 
become detached from reality in mine-affected countries and from actual 
demining activities would be particularly unfortunate given that its strength 
lay in engaging the expertise of mine action practitioners. 
Mine Action Programming 
Fundamentally, as enshrined in the APMBC and the International Mine 
Action Standards (IMAS) issued by the UN, States are responsible for 
clearing mines within their own territory (even if they were not responsible 
for their emplacement), typically under the auspices of an inter-ministerial 
national mine action authority (NMAA). A Mine Action Centre (MAC) is 
responsible for day-to-day coordination and implementation of mine action 
policy and activities. However, States emerging from conflict commonly 
lack the capacity to manage their mine action activities, or there may be a 
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political vacuum in a country or region. In such cases, the UN may assume 
this role. Local capacity building is a central goal in order to hand 
responsibility for this activity back as soon as possible to the legitimate 
national authorities. 
Capacity building in mine action is understood as ‘a state’s ability and 
willingness to develop and articulate mine action policy and direction. It is 
also about a state’s ability to plan, coordinate, manage and sustain a mine 
action programme that is accountable, cost-effective and able to address the 
humanitarian and socio-economic implications of landmine contamination, 
and to provide appropriate legislation’.26 Mine action programming, as with 
other externally supported peacebuilding efforts, suffers from the 
‘Samaritan’s Dilemma’. As Maslen notes, ‘the generosity of donors can 
make it less likely that the recipients exert the necessary efforts to help 
themselves’.27 This concern has been reflected in calls for a more critical 
assessment of the actual rather than intended capacity building effects of 
externally sponsored and implemented mine action activities.
One challenge to capacity building has been a preference by donors 
for home-grown organisations and in-kind contributions – such as staff and 
equipment – when these have not been the most appropriate solutions to a 
given national or local mine action context. Similarly, the selection of MAC 
staff has been criticised in a number of studies with the prevalence of 
military and former military personnel proving a barrier to fostering the 
developmental and capacity building aspects of mine action.28 As noted by 
Kjellman et al, ‘such a professional composition is not necessarily inherently 
problematic, but it does have the potential to limit the understanding of 
broader humanitarian objectives within mine action, and brings with it an 
approach in which authority and the possibility for sanctions may tend to 
dominate’.29
Significant questions remain over the development of capacity to 
govern mine activities by national authorities. Executive and legislative 
bodies must be capable of assuming responsibility for setting policy, 
overseeing and managing mine action at the national level. There is also an 
emerging recognition that capacity building of mine action actors at the local 
level can only be optimised within the framework of an effective national 
mine action strategy.30 Security sector actors and institutions are key to 
addressing these issues in practice. Overall planning and priorities need to be 
agreed at national level and sequencing is essential: why clear schools if 
there are no teachers? Security sector governance actors should also be much 
more closely implicated in an aspect of mine action programming that 
receives insufficient attention: corruption. Diversion of funds, self-interested 
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selection of clearance tasks and ‘land-grabbing’ have long been associated 
with certain demining programmes. Responsibility for this issue rests with 
the range of civil management and oversight bodies at the national level as 
well as judicial and public security bodies and civil society at national and 
local levels (see Table 8.2). A recent study on the development of national 
mine action legislation31 highlights a number of significant potential benefits 
from the development of such legislation including improved coordination 
within government and with international actors, improved accreditation 
procedures as well as increased transparency and accountability. Failure to 
address such concerns erodes donor confidence, undermines the goals of 
mine action programmes and has particularly important consequences at the 
national level in the face of public scrutiny.  
There is a significant potential role for current and former military 
forces in demining, stockpile destruction, and other aspects of mine action. 
Coordination of military forces at the national level is particularly important. 
Revising military doctrine, manuals and retraining troops are some measures 
that may be required in regard to legal obligations under the APMBC. 
Equally important is to acknowledge areas where military forces are weak, 
notably in taking account of socio-economic criteria and implementing 
community-based mine risk education.32 The link between DDR and 
building mine action capacity, discussed below in the case of Kosovo, has 
not been adequately explored in more general terms. Similarly the use of 
military troops for demining as a post-conflict confidence-building measure 
in local communities has been noted in cases such as Nicaragua and 
Thailand, but broader lessons have not been developed.  
State and civil society actors also have a very important role in land 
allocation and protection of land rights as well as mine risk education and 
victim assistance at the community level. There is a need to better link these 
issues with other civil society roles in advocating for and assisting 
communities. As Harpviken and Skara point out, ‘it is therefore important 
that priorities are set in a legitimate and transparent manner in order to 
reduce the potential for tension; this will ultimately also serve as a model for 
good governance’.33 In this respect, armed non-state armed actors who 
represent a major category of mine users today need to be more effectively 
engaged.34 They often control mined territory and are responsible for the 
manufacture, trade, selling and use of landmines. However, being 
characterised by decentralisation, poverty and unwillingness to compromise, 
they offer a qualitatively different challenge to State actors (see Chapter 3). 
NGOs can play an important role in addressing armed non-state actors when 
States are unwilling or unable to negotiate with such actors. The ICRC has a 
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long history of such engagement while the NGO Geneva Call was 
established in 2000 with the specific mandate of engaging such armed 
groups in a ban on APMs and in the respect for humanitarian norms. It does 
so through encouraging groups to adhere to Deeds of Commitment that 
mirror the requirements the APMBC places on states.35
Mine action programming, therefore, must emphasise local ownership 
and the building of genuine national capacity over the long-term. Addressing 
the obstacles described above should dictate the timing of handovers to local 
authorities. Kosovo is the only case to date where the UN has handed over 
responsibility for mine action to local actors and, as discussed below, 
subsequent developments in that province have not been unproblematic.  
Mine Action in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding 
Mine action reduces deaths and injuries and allows refugees and internally 
displaced persons to return home in relative safety following the end of 
hostilities. It is also an important enabling activity for rebuilding economies, 
transport and other infrastructure as well as providing jobs (including for 
former combatants). Consequently there is an obvious need for integration of 
mine action with other post-conflict peacebuilding tasks geared to providing 
a secure environment such as SALW measures, DDR, and broader efforts to 
address disrupted social and economic networks.  
Mine action’s impact on security in post-conflict peacebuilding is 
demonstrated by over 37 million stockpiled APMs destroyed to date36 in 
accordance with the requirements of the APMBC. The value of destroying 
ordnance stockpiles following the end of hostilities is highlighted in the case 
of Iraq where vast quantities of munitions were littered throughout the 
country in both rural and urban settings following the fall of the Saddam 
regime, posing a threat to both coalition security and local communities. 
Indeed, such ordnance was used in the bomb attack on UN Headquarters in 
Baghdad on 10 August 2003 which caused the deaths of 22 UN staff, 
including UN Special Envoy Sergio Vieira de Mello.37 The priority given to 
this issue is shown in the award of contracts by the US, valued at more than 
$478 million in 2003 alone, to begin disposal of Iraqi ordnance.38
The willingness of former parties to a conflict to reveal the location of 
minefields, destroy stockpiles or agree to clearance in territory under their 
control is not just a disarmament activity but an evident confidence-building 
measure. It is also important to note that the stigmatisation of APMs in 
particular is felt on the ground (as well as by the international community). 
This is an important distinction from small arms, which are frequently 
Optimising Mine Action Policies and Practice  173 
regarded as legitimate (see Chapter 7), and contributes to the widespread 
perception of demining as an ‘honourable’ profession.  
In a number of cases, the decision to include mine action in peace 
agreements has resulted in important benefits.39 The obligation on former 
parties to a conflict to provide information on mine-laying can be one 
important output. Equally important is the willingness indicated by such an 
agreement of the new national authorities to commit to mine action. The 
1992 Mozambique peace agreement made no reference to mine action and 
the lack of agreement on such activities by former warring parties meant that 
a UN programme was initiated with no clear planning for the handover of 
responsibilities to national authorities, resulting in years of misguided and 
inefficient mine action efforts.  
However, Harpviken and Skara conclude from a review of donor 
policy statements that ‘the link between mine action and peacebuilding is 
generally acknowledged, but poorly developed’.40 Applying the logic of 
peacebuilding to mine action can have limited or counter-intuitive results if 
not done carefully. In Mozambique, road clearance was prioritised as an 
immediate support to the UN peacebuilding mission in that country. 
Contracts worth hundreds of thousands of dollars were given out to clear 
2,000 kilometres of roads which, after months of operations, uncovered only 
six mines.41 More critically, Harpviken and Roberts describe how the 
demining and reopening of Highway A9 in Sri Lanka enabled internally 
displaced persons to return home to settlements that had not themselves been 
cleared, leading to casualties among returnees.42 There is also a seemingly 
logical link between building mine action capacity and DDR with 
demobilised soldiers offering a ready pool of recruits already familiar with 
handling weapons and accustomed to following orders and set procedures. 
However, the cases of Afghanistan and Kosovo below give contrasting 
messages as to the potential benefits of such linkages. 
These examples reflect the vulnerability of external actors to 
unfamiliar and complex local contexts. While mine action capacity building 
can provide a model for re-establishing good governance the inverse is also 
true. The influx of foreign investment can cause tensions and attract the 
corrupt and self-interested. 
In summary, mine action is one of the earliest entry points for the 
international community in states emerging from conflict. If conducted well, 
it can offer significant security benefits through its disarmament and 
confidence building effects which are not only positive in their own right but 
serve as enabling activities for related peacebuilding tasks. Moreover, if the 
national capacity-building dimension of mine action is developed, important 
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emulation effects for other areas of security governance can be accrued. 
However these ‘ideal’ goals often founder in complex post-conflict 
environments. The following section addresses such challenges based on 
mine action experiences in Afghanistan and Kosovo. 
Lessons from Afghanistan and Kosovo 
This section considers mine action, in particular the governance of mine 
action, in the specific post-conflict peacebuilding contexts of Afghanistan 
and Kosovo. While not seeking to directly compare two very different cases, 
both have received significant investments from the international community 
and in terms of mine action are held to be models for successful 
programmes, with responsibility for mine action in Kosovo handed back to 
local actors in 2001 and a similar handover planned in Afghanistan by the 
end of 2005. 
Afghanistan 
Afghanistan is one of the most heavily mined countries in the world. Soviet 
forces entered the country in December 1979 in support of an Afghan 
government which had seized power in an April 1978 coup d’état. Conflict
between Soviet-backed government forces and Mujahedeen rebel forces 
grew in scale with the rebels increasingly supported by the West. The 1989 
withdrawal of Soviet forces was the precursor to the collapse in 1992 of the 
‘communist’ regime. A period of fighting among rebel groups was followed 
in 1994 by the emergence of the Taliban as a political and military force. 
Within the next two years the Taliban gained control of most of the country, 
including Kabul. Linkages between the Taliban government and Al-Qaida 
were the catalyst, following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, for 
the US-led military intervention which overthrew the Taliban to be replaced 
by the government of Hamid Karzai. 
In 1988, after unsuccessful military-driven efforts to train Afghan 
deminers, the UN supported the creation of a number of specialist Afghan 
NGOs operating under international supervision from neighbouring 
Pakistan. Although the plan was met with concern by the international 
community – in particular over the need to give training in explosives to 
former guerrilla fighters – it was the only viable option on the table and 
formed the basis for today’s Mine Action Programme in Afghanistan 
(MAPA). The programme includes national and regional offices as well as 
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oversight responsibility for 15 Afghan NGOs. Regime change in 
Afghanistan made available unprecedented levels of funding for mine action 
as part of the wider reconstruction process, opening up previously 
inaccessible areas of the country for clearance. This opportunity immediately 
presented the problem that little information was available on the extent of 
mine or UXO infestation that would permit priority-setting.  
A recurrent problem in Afghanistan is that despite the high overall 
level of funding the delivery of funds by the UN-administered VTF has been 
erratic, with arrears in payments to Afghan NGOs resulting in operating 
problems and potential gaps in operational and equipment standards.43 A 
specific consequence of the broader peacebuilding context in Afghanistan is 
that demining organisations have been losing staff to the UN as well as other 
agencies and contractors offering higher salary scales.  
The ongoing military action has posed problems for mine action 
operations. Initially, sub-munitions were deployed which are particularly 
difficult to make safe and had the same distinctive colour as UN air-dropped 
food parcels.44 Moreover, according to one MACA employee, a lack of 
coordination between the UN-controlled International Security Assistance 
Force and demining organisations has led to a number of incidents including 
the killing of four deminers by security guards.45
One specific initiative, Mine Action for Peace (MAFP), has tried to 
link mine action with the reintegration of soldiers in their own communities, 
setting mine action efforts alongside the broader goals of transforming 
relationships between former combatants and facilitating reintegration. The 
initiative is integrated in the MACA but is also part of the broader DDR 
effort in Afghanistan – the Afghan New Beginnings Programme (ANBP). 
The goal of MAFP is to give former combatants, selected in conjunction 
with local councils, a package of mine action and vocational training, a 
reintegration grant and thirteen months guaranteed employment. However, 
in a review of the programme, Strand notes two sets of challenges that 
affected its implementation:46
Contextual challenges included factional disputes, weak central 
government, unrealistically high donor expectations and competition 
from opium farming;  
Specific problems stemming from the overall management role of the 
ANBP. Symptomatic was a decision to withhold a payment to hand in 
weapons, on the basis that former commanders would seek to obtain 
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them, seriously undermined confidence in the programme as well as 
the broader DDR programme from participants.  
Strand suggests that the inexperience of national staff members and 
international staff with a predominantly military mindset and limited 
knowledge of the Afghan context contributed to ‘the relative inflexibility of 
the organisation and for the emphasis on the technical, as opposed to the 
larger political and social, aspects of the programme’.47 Despite these 
problems, the programme has proved effective in disrupting commander-
combatant relationships, supporting community reintegration and reconciling 
former combatants from opposing factions. It is notable that the DDR 
dimension was greatly facilitated by being grafted on to an already mature 
and respected activity in mine action. 
The historical strength of the Afghan mine action programme, coupled 
with unprecedented levels of donor support, provide a firm basis for 
continued progress in clearing the country of mines and UXO. A recent 
Needs Assessment suggests that, dependent on a sustained commitment, 
Afghanistan could be free of the ‘impact’ of mines within five to seven 
years.48 The critical challenge for mine action (as for reconstruction and 
development more broadly) is one of capacity building and ownership. There 
is a danger that responsibility for mine action is handed back to Afghan 
ownership before its institutions are ready to assume the demands of policy 
and management required by this role. It is also important to recognise that 
while national capacity may be deficient, capacity-building at the regional 
level in the NGOs that conduct mine action is the major success story of 
mine action in Afghanistan. Consequently, there is a related danger that the 
historical neutrality of the Afghan NGOs involved in this work, which has 
proved constant through over a decade of operations, is jeopardised. As 
Maslen notes, given that the security situation in Afghanistan remains 
dangerous and humanitarian organisations are not immune to being targeted, 
‘many NGOs are therefore sensitive to any change in the programme that 
gives it more of a government identity’.49 Weak government capacity, 
ongoing military operations and the only very recent development an 
adequate legal framework within which mine action is situated therefore 
suggest that the transition of ownership should not be rushed in Afghanistan.  
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Kosovo
Kosovo’s mine and UXO problem does not have a long historical legacy but 
came about as a result of fighting between the ethnic Albanian Kosovo 
Liberation Army (KLA) and Serb forces which broke out in 1998 following 
years of tension during conflict in the wider Balkan region. Failed 
negotiations driven by the international community were followed by NATO 
airstrikes against Serbian military targets which added unexploded sub-
munitions to the barrier and nuisance minefields laid by the opposing 
forces.50 The 11-week bombing campaign was ultimately successful, 
resulting in a ceasefire agreement on 3 June 1999. 
UN Security Council Resolution 1244 provides the governing 
framework in Kosovo under which NATO-led Kosovo Stabilisation Force 
(KFOR) troops are mandated to provide a stable and secure environment in 
coordination with the UN Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK), 
established on 10 June 1999. Immediately following the end of hostilities, 
ethnic Albanian refugees and internally displaced persons flooded the 
heavily mine and UXO-affected region seeking to return home. UNMIK, 
through UNMAS, established a Mine Action Coordination Centre (MACC) 
as early as 17 June 1999, mandated to manage and coordinate all mine action 
within Kosovo with the support of KFOR, the humanitarian community and 
international donors. 
MACC Programme Manager John Flanagan notes that ‘the MACC 
was deliberately set up as a “coordination centre”, rather than the more 
traditional mine action centre,’51 allowing other organisations to focus on 
their core competences. The availability and management of information 
was key to this role and a dedicated tool, the Information Management 
System for Mine Action (IMSMA), which is now used in more than 80 
percent of mine action programmes,52 was first deployed in Kosovo. 
Information made available on Serb and KLA mine-laying53 was 
complemented, following institutional bottlenecks and problems of security 
classification, by details of NATO bombing missions. Similar delays were 
encountered in the provision of information by KFOR on demining 
conducted in support of KFOR operations.  
The plethora of bilaterally-funded NGOs and commercial 
organisations working on aspects of mine action in the province provided a 
major coordination challenge for the MACC. Some of these organisations 
had limited practical experience and a lack of standing operating procedures 
which undoubtedly led to duplication of effort and increased cost. These 
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bilateral arrangements also meant that the MACC’s coordination role was 
based on goodwill rather than authority. 
Personnel and equipment needs of the newly established MACC were 
largely met by donations from various governments with in-kind 
outnumbering regular staff by a ratio of nearly two to one. In many cases 
these staff had no experience in mine action, which led to a credibility gap 
given the coordination role of the MACC.54 Funding proved an ongoing 
concern for the programme with significant donor funding channelled 
bilaterally. This factor was highlighted in the UN-commissioned review of 
the Kosovo mine action operation: ‘in any peacebuilding operation, mine 
action should not be a discretionary activity left to the charitable impulses of 
the donor community’.55As an example, the UNMIK budget for 1999–2000, 
was not made available to the programme until late 2000.56
Kosovo’s status as an international protectorate has implications for 
all post-conflict peacebuilding activities in the province. Political authority 
remains largely with UNMIK although specific responsibilities have been 
gradually transferred to local provisional institutions. Mine action was 
labelled from a very early stage as an activity suitable to be handed over to 
local authorities. In this respect a key UNMIK decision was that 
responsibility for mine clearance be given to the Kosovo Protection Corps 
(KPC), an organisation made up of demobilised ethnic Albanian fighters and 
very closely identified with the KLA. This was deemed by UNMIK to be an 
effective way to demilitarise and reintegrate former combatants but had a 
number of unforeseen results. First, the decision reduced options for building 
civilian mine action capacity by depriving inhabitants of the province who 
had already been trained of long-term employment prospects. Second, initial 
training of the KPC was not ‘fit to task’ resulting in poor work. Third, major 
concerns were raised about the political and ethnic bias of the force, 
particularly if deployed in ethnic Serb enclaves. This final point was 
reflected in a lack of support by KFOR, particularly concerned by the 
prospect of giving the KPC explosives, which led to significant delays in 
implementing the policy. 
Responsibility for mine action was handed to newly founded 
government authorities on 15 December 2001, despite a residual landmine 
and UXO threat. Concerns were voiced that this was a political exit strategy 
by UNMIK that came too early for the nascent executive. This is borne out 
by the fact that senior management posts are still held by international staff 
and a lack of capacity in the relevant Ministries is apparent. As a 
consequence, authority for mine action in early 2004 moved back to 
responsibility of UN Special Representative, reflecting a need for greater 
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control and oversight. On the operational level, although recent 
improvements have been noted, the KPC has proved inefficient and certain 
clearance tasks have been assumed by their international trainers, the NGO 
Handicap International. In six districts declared free of mines and UXO, 
contamination has subsequently been found, leading to new surveys and 
clearance as well as to significant embarrassment for the UN and donors.57
The threat posed by mines and UXO in Kosovo has been significantly 
reduced since 1999 but the mine action faces the same governance questions 
relating to capacity and ownership vis à vis the role of the international 
community that need to be addressed in the province.  
Conclusion and Policy Recommendations 
This chapter has sought to delineate the governance of mine action at the 
levels of strategic policy and programming. As demonstrated by the cases of 
Afghanistan and Kosovo, the governance of mine action is further 
complicated in the context of post-conflict peacebuilding as the constellation 
of actors and their interactions increase. It is argued that applying a security 
governance perspective provides a useful way of deconstructing the policy 
process and its relation to mine action programming. Moreover, it enables a 
better understanding of the linkages and potential synergies between mine 
action and other aspects of the post-conflict peacebuilding agenda. On this 
basis the following recommendations are proposed: 
Legal and normative frameworks for mine action at the international 
level could further contribute to effectiveness at national and sub-
national levels. The APMBC and CCW work programmes provide a 
mechanism for the oversight of mine action that has not been fully 
exploited to date. Greater transparency and critical analysis on how 
resources are used – both by mine action programmes and mine 
affected states – would result in significant benefits on the ground if 
backed up by sufficient political will.  
Better coordination of mine action is a precondition for better 
integration with the broader post-conflict peacebuilding agenda.
Short-term or slowly disbursed funding and the provision of 
inappropriate in-kind contributions continues to hamper the effective 
implementation of mine action programmes. Bureaucratic knots need 
to be untied and programmes provided with ‘fit to task’ tools and 
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adequate funding if they are to succeed in already difficult 
environments. Moreover, if the UN’s coordination role is to be 
successful, bilateral donors and other mine action funders must ensure 
that this role is enshrined in agreements with mine action NGOs and 
commercial companies and that they apply the same standards in their 
work.
Effective mine action as peacebuilding requires all elements of the 
international community’s response to pull together. There is a 
significant potential for mine action to make a more explicit 
contribution to post-conflict peacebuilding. This requires greater 
coordination between transitional administrations, peacekeeping 
forces, mine action stakeholders and other relevant actors. In 
particular, it is essential that decisions are not based on ‘political’ 
criteria but on a realistic appreciation of the local context. This entails 
embracing expertise from related security and development fields, 
notably NGO experts who in many cases are closer to what is 
happening on the ground. Enlarging the knowledge base, in terms of 
research, policy and programming, will enable new insights to be 
developed and allow the international community to better situate 
mine action with other development priorities.  
The provision of accurate and timely information is indispensable to 
mine action. Accurate information is arguably the most important and 
source difficult to obtain commodity in complex post-conflict 
situations. Knowledge of the local context is essential for all 
peacebuilding activities in order to avoid sub-optimal results as a 
result of ‘imported’ approaches. The provision of relevant 
information, including on mine use, should be enshrined wherever 
possible in peace agreements between former warring parties.  
Information of use to mine action organisations such as military mine 
clearance activities and bomb damage assessment reports is often 
available but compartmentalised and difficult to access. This should 
be supplied as a matter of course and included in appropriate rules and 
guidelines. The effective use of liaison officers between, for example, 
the mine action coordination body in country and other agencies, is 
one way to address such gaps.  
Building sustainable local capacity in states emerging from conflict is 
the most difficult but most important objective in both mine action and 
peacebuilding more broadly. The paucity of concrete examples where 
ownership of mine action has been successfully handed back to 
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national authorities is testament to the difficulty of building 
sustainable capacity. A focus on governance structures and 
mechanisms will facilitate sustainability: at the national level, 
capacity-building for mine action needs to be closely linked to broader 
efforts to encourage transparency, accountability and democratic 
oversight in the area of security governance including the legislative, 
executive and judiciary as well as security sector actors such as the 
police, army and border management agencies. Capacity-building 
opportunities should pay particular attention to the role of civil 
society, in particular at local and regional. Finally, local ownership 
involves leaps of faith in engaging actors with often difficult conflict 
histories. This requires ongoing assessment and a willingness to 
impose sanctions if evidence of misuse is apparent. 
The process that led to the APMBC has achieved unprecedented results in 
normative and practical terms while also invigorating advocacy on other 
related humanitarian issues. Mine action has also adapted and developed 
over a relatively short time period, particularly through greater appreciation 
of the socio-economic dimensions of the issue. However, its particular 
evolution points to the need for the better integration of mine action with 
other security and development issues. As this chapter has sought to 
highlight, more effective coordination and cooperation at headquarters and 
on the ground, coupled with a determination to build local capacity in 
difficult circumstances, will reinforce the significant efforts of all those who 
work in this key area of post-conflict peacebuilding.  
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